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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is now widely accepted that global climate change will have 
dramatic impacts for the Arctic. The rapid warming of the Arctic 
climate was the first and most prominent of the ten key findings of 
the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)1. In September 
2007, the Arctic ice cap was 23% below the last record, set in 
2005.2 This 2007 record exceeded the computer model predictions 
used to prepare the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007.3 Perhaps even 
more important than ice-coverage as such, is the increasing per-
centage of first-year sea ice. Many scientists fear that the “Arctic 
meltdown” has become irreversible, even though the 2007 record 
remained intact in 2008.  
 Of particular importance to this paper are ACIA’s key findings 
number four, “[a]nimal species’ diversity, ranges, and distribution 
will change” and number six, “[r]educed sea ice is very likely to in-
crease marine transport and access to resources.”4 While the for-
mer predicts changes in the composition of the Arctic marine eco-
system in quantitative, qualitative, spatial, and temporal terms, 
the latter predicts increased pressure on this ecosystem due to 
more intensive exercise of existing maritime uses as well as new 
                                                                                                                   
 1. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 10 (2004). 
 2. Press Release, Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous 
Record Lows (Oct. 1, 2007), http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/ 
20071001_pressrelease.html. 
 3. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Atmosphere Res., Arctic Ice Retreating More Quickly 
than Computer Models Project (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/ 
2007/seaice.html. 
 4. HASSOL, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
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uses. Examples of these are maritime navigation (for the transport 
of persons and cargo, including for tourism and military purposes), 
exploration and exploitation of living (e.g., fishing) and non-living 
(e.g., oil and gas) marine resources, construction of artificial instal-
lations, laying of cables and pipelines, overflight and marine scien-
tific research (including bio-prospecting).  
 In view of these current and predicted threats to the Arctic ma-
rine ecosystem, the question logically arises if existing Arctic gov-
ernance and regulatory regimes are adequately responding to 
these threats.5 The Arctic is covered by a variety of governance and 
regulatory regimes relating to the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment and the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biodiversity. However, some commentators perceive the 
planting of the flag of the Russian Federation on the deep-sea bed 
of the North Pole in August 2007 as the start of the last “scramble 
for territory and resources”6 in human history, likely even to lead 
to armed conflicts. One of the key messages of the May 2008 Ilulis-
sat Declaration by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states7 is that this 
perception is fundamentally flawed.  
 The objective of this paper is to examine (in a historical pers-
pective) the roles of the European Union (EU) and Canada in go-
vernance and regulation of human activities in the Arctic Ocean. 
Section two describes the existing “tangled” nature of governance 
in the Arctic with a focus on law of the sea, approaches and chal-
lenges in the region, as well as on EU and Canadian participation 
in the activities of the Arctic Council. The “shifting seascape” in 
governance is next highlighted in section three with a review of 
increasing calls for change from scholars and other groups, recent 
governance initiatives from the United States and Arctic Ocean 
coastal states, and evolving EU and Canadian perspectives to-
wards ocean governance. The paper concludes with section four, 
which surveys possible future directions for strengthening ocean 
                                                                                                                   
 5. For a recent discussion on Arctic fisheries, see ERIK J. MOLENAAR & ROBERT 
CORELL, BACKGROUND PAPER: ARCTIC FISHERIES (2009), available at http://www.arctic-
transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf. For a recent discussion on Arctic shipping, see Erik J. 
Molenaar, Arctic Marine Shipping: Overview of the International Legal Framework, Gaps 
and Options, 18 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289 (2009). For a cross-sectional discus-
sion, see TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGU-
LATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: OVERVIEW AND GAP ANALYSIS (2009), available at 
http://www.panda.org/arctic.  
 6. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of 
Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 63. 
 7. Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration (May 28, 2008), available at 
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf. [hereinafter Ilulissat 
Declaration]. The five are: Canada, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland), Norway, the Russian 
Federation and the United States. 
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governance in the Arctic, with the spectrum of options including, 
among others, expanding the spatial scopes of the North-East At-
lantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), established by the NEAFC 
Convention8, and the OSPAR Commission, established by the Con-
vention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic (OSPAR) Convention,9 and reform by means of an 
Implementing Agreement under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOS)10. 
 
II.  TANGLED GOVERNANCE 
 
A.  The Law of the Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
 The cornerstones of the current international law of the sea are 
the LOS Convention and its two Implementing Agreements, the 
Part XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement,11 and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement.12 The current international law of the sea applies to 
the marine environment of the entire globe; including, therefore, 
the entire marine environment of the Arctic Ocean,                    
however defined. 
 The LOS Convention’s overarching objective is to establish a 
universally accepted, just, and equitable legal order, or “Constitu-
tion,” for the oceans that lessens the risk of international conflict 
and enhances stability and peace in the international community. 
The LOS Convention currently has 160 parties, the Part XI Deep-
Sea Mining Agreement has 138 parties, and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement has 77 parties. All Arctic states are parties to these 
three treaties, except for the United States, which is not a party to 
either the LOS Convention or the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining 
Agreement.13 The European Community (EC) is party to all three 
                                                                                                                   
 8. Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, 
Nov. 18, 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129 [hereinafter NEAFC].  
 9. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East At-
lantic, Sept. 22, 1992 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention], available at http://www.ospar.org/ 
html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf (in force Mar. 
25, 1998); id., Annex V (in force Aug. 30, 2000); id. art. 27(2). 
 10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
 11. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309. 
 12. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 34 
I.L.M. 1542. 
 13. See United Nations, Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the 
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treaties. This is important in view of the fact that Denmark, Fin-
land, and Sweden are Member States of the European Union14 and 
Iceland and Norway are parties to the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Agreement.15 
 The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty, sovereign 
rights, freedoms, rights, jurisdiction, and obligations of states 
within several maritime zones. The most important of these, for 
the Arctic, are internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), continental shelf, high seas, and the “Area.”16 Internal 
waters lie landward of the baselines. The maximum breadth of the 
territorial sea is twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1,852 me-
ters) measured from the baselines. Twenty-four nautical miles is 
the maximum breadth for the contiguous zone as is 200 nautical 
miles for the EEZ. However, in many geographical settings these 
maximum breadths cannot be reached due to the proximity of the 
baselines of opposite states. In such circumstances, maritime 
boundaries have to be agreed on by the opposite states. Several of 
these maritime boundaries have already been established in the 
Arctic Ocean and negotiations on several others are still ongoing.  
 The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal 
state over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial 
sea, the airspace above, and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty en-
tails exclusive access and control of living and non-living resources 
and all-encompassing jurisdiction over all human activities, unless 
states have in one way or another consented to restrictions there-
on. The LOS Convention also recognizes specific economic and re-
source-related sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state 
with respect to its EEZ and, where relevant, outer continental 
shelf. Nevertheless, other states have navigational rights or free-
doms within the maritime zones of coastal states and with respect 
to their EEZ, and, where relevant, outer continental shelf, also the 
freedoms of overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines 
and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to         
these freedoms . . . .”17 
 Article 76 of the LOS Convention also recognizes that in cer-
tain circumstances the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nauti-
                                                                                                                   
Related Agreements, as at 5 February 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/ 
status2008.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009). 
 14. Even though EU membership of Denmark does not encompass Greenland.  
 15. Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1, 
3.1.1994.  Note that the EEA Agreement does not apply to Svalbard. 
 16. The LOS Convention defines “[a]rea” as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”  LOS Convention, supra note 10,         
art. 1(1)(1). 
 17. LOS Convention, supra note 10, art. 58(1). 
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cal miles from the baselines. This is the so-called “outer continen-
tal shelf.” Coastal states that take the view that they have an out-
er continental shelf must submit information on their outer limits 
on the basis of the criteria in Article 76 to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).18 “The limits of the [outer 
continental] shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of 
these recommendations [of the CLCS] shall be final and binding.”19 
So far, only the Russian Federation and Norway have made sub-
missions to the CLCS in relation to their outer continental shelves 
that lie within the Arctic Ocean. The CLCS has, up until now, only 
made an interim recommendation in relation to the submission of 
the Russian Federation.20 The CLCS essentially recommended that 
the Russian Federation make a revised submission as regards the 
central Arctic Ocean basin.21 The Russian Federation is expected 
to do this in 2010. Canada, Denmark (in relation to Greenland), 
and the United States are all engaged in activities to enable them 
to make submissions to the CLCS, despite the fact that the United 
States is not yet party to the LOS Convention.22 Canada has to 
make its submission by December 2013 and Denmark by Decem-
ber 2014.23 It should be noted that it is likely that there will be two 
pockets of the Area in the central Arctic Ocean and one large high 
seas pocket.  
 In the high seas, all states have the freedoms already men-
tioned above as well as the freedom to construct artificial islands 
and other installations, the freedom to fish, and the freedom to 
conduct scientific research. These freedoms are all subject to condi-
tions and obligations.24 The Area and its resources are the “com-
mon heritage of mankind” and the International Sea-Bed Authori-
ty (ISA) is charged with organizing and controlling all activities of 
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.25 
 
2. Rights, Interests, and Obligations of the EU and Its               
Member States 
                                                                                                                   
 18.  Id. art. 76. 
 19. Id. art. 76(8). 
 20. The Secretary-General, Addendum to Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Oceans of the Law and the Sea, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/57/Add.1 
(Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/ 
PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement. 
 21.  Id. ¶ 41. 
 22. See National Security Presidential Directive No. 66 & Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive No. 25: Artic Region Policy at sec. D(4)(a) (Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter 
Presidential Policy Directive], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov. 
 23. See LOS Convention, supra note 10, annex II, art. 4. 
 24. Id. art. 87(1). 
 25. Id. arts. 1(1)(3), 136, 156, 157(1). 
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 The competence of the EU and its Member States regarding 
the Arctic Ocean is determined by general international law as 
well as by European Community (EC) law. It goes without saying 
that EU Member States cannot confer more extensive competence 
to the EU than they themselves possess in accordance with inter-
national law. 
 The fact that none of the current EU Member States are coast-
al states with respect to the Arctic Ocean (not even via the EEA 
Agreement or via Greenland, which chose in the mid-1980s to 
withdraw from the then EEC, and hence is not part of the EC or 
EU) is clearly a major feature and constraint of EU policy regard-
ing the Arctic Ocean. While neither the EU nor its Member States 
can act as coastal states with respect to the Arctic Ocean, they can 
still act in a wide range of other capacities. For instance, they may 
act as flag states, port states, market states, or with respect to 
their natural and legal persons. In a flag state capacity, the EU 
and its Member States are able to exercise their rights and dis-
charge their obligations with respect to the Arctic Ocean, most 
notably the freedoms of the high seas in the high seas pockets in 
the Arctic Ocean (e.g., marine scientific research and the laying of 
cables and pipelines), the navigational rights and freedoms in the 
maritime zones of Arctic Ocean coastal states, and the obligations 
relating to marine living resources and the marine environment 
connected to these rights and freedoms.  
 In addition to these rights and obligations, the EU and its 
Member States may also have various user and non-user interests 
in the Arctic Ocean. The main user interests would be related to 
the exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon resources. 
As traditional energy resources will be of paramount importance to 
all EU Member States for at least the next few decades, access to 
the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be an important secu-
rity issue. The main non-user interests include the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment and safeguarding marine 
biodiversity. The EU and its Member States could argue that they 
want to become involved in the governance and regulation of the 
marine Arctic to safeguard these non-user interests, in their own 
right, or, together with non-Arctic states, on behalf of the interna-
tional community. Such participation may for instance be aimed at 
monitoring and ensuring that obligations with respect to the Arctic 
marine area are complied with. 
 In case the EU would act, it would also need to have shared or 
exclusive competence. The distribution of competence between the 
EU and its Member States is determined by the EC Treaty, the EU 
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Treaty,26 and other treaties concluded within the framework of the 
EC and the EU. The scope and extent of EC and EU competence is 
governed by the principle of conferral and the use of conferred (ex-
clusive) competence is, inter alia, governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.27 The distribution of competence 
is a dynamic matter in which the judgments of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) play a key role. While adjustments of competence 
can be a consequence of increasing importance of EC legislation 
and acts by the EC Commission, it can also be negotiated between 
EU Member States. The latter adjustments can lead to more com-
petence being conferred to the EC and EU but also to competence 
being delegated back to EU Member States. 
 The spheres in which the EC has competence can be gleaned 
from Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which lists the activities the EC 
shall undertake for the purposes set out in Article 2. While Article 
3 sets out the policy areas which the EU may address, it does not 
in itself provide a legal basis for specific legislative acts. The spe-
cific measures available to the EC are set out in other parts of the 
EC Treaty. Included in this list are fishing, shipping (transport), 
and environmental protection.28 In addition, Article 6 of the EC 
Treaty stipulates, “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Com-
munity policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”29 
 EU Member States are generally free to pursue their own poli-
cies alongside the EU, unless the EU’s or EC’s competence is ex-
clusive or a subject matter in shared competence is dealt with ex-
haustively by the EU, leaving the Member States no room for addi-
tional measures. The ECJ already ruled in 1981 that the EC has 
exclusive competence in fisheries conservation and management.30 
This exclusiveness relates to community waters and probably also 
seaward thereof, but is also subject to some exceptions, for in-
stance in relation to enforcement.31 The consequential external 
                                                                                                                   
 26. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13 
[hereinafter EU Treaty]. 
 27. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
art. 5, 2006 O.J. (C 321) E1 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; EU Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 4-5.  
 28. The sectors and spheres listed in Article 3 of the EC Treaty are addressed in more 
detail in other provisions in the EC Treaty. As regards fisheries, see EC Treaty, supra note 
27, arts. 32-38; as regards shipping, see id. arts. 70-80; as regards environmental protection, 
see id. arts. 6, 174-176.  
 29. Id. art. 6.  
 30. Comm’n of the Eur. Community. v. U.K., 1981 E.C.R. 1045.  
 31. See Eur. Community, Declaration Upon Signature of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
(June 27, 1996), available at  http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
fish_stocks_agreement_declarations.htm#EC; Eur. Community, Declaration Upon 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2081919 
Spring, 2009]  ARCTIC OCEAN GOVERNANCE 255 
 
competence of the EC in the sphere of fisheries implies that the EC 
represents EU Member States, for instance in negotiations with 
non-EU Member States and in regional fisheries management or-
ganizations (RFMOs). Subject to some exceptions, EU Member 
States cannot become members of RFMOs alongside the EC. One 
of these exceptions relates to “overseas countries and territories” 
and enables, inter alia, Denmark to become a member of RFMOs 
alongside the EC on behalf of the Faroe Island, Greenland, or both. 
 Competence with regards to shipping and environmental pro-
tection is shared between the EU and its Member States. This 
mixed competence also means that the EC cannot represent EU 
Member States in international fora, like the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO). So far, the EC has, as an intergovern-
mental organization, concluded an agreement on cooperation with 
the IMO.32 In areas of shared competence, agreements are often 
signed by the EC as well as by EU Member States (so-called 
“mixed agreements”).33 This requires close cooperation                
between them. 
 Competence over offshore hydrocarbon activities is a much less 
straightforward matter. While the list in Article 3 of the EC Treaty 
does not include the specific term “offshore hydrocarbon activities,” 
it could be argued it falls within the scope of the broader term or 
sphere of “energy” referred to in Article 3(1)(u). As Article 3 does 
not give the EC a general legal basis for legislation in the field of 
energy,34 the EC may be able to adopt enactments that rely on one 
or more of the other bases in Article 3 or pursue one or more of the 
objectives set out in Article 2 that in one way or another impact 
offshore hydrocarbon activities undertaken within the maritime 
zones of EU Member States or seaward thereof by EU Member 
States or their natural or legal persons. Environmental protection 
would be an example. It is clear that, at the most, competence 
would be shared and not exclusive.  
 
3. Canada and the Law of the Sea in the Arctic 
 
 Canada might be described as a pioneer in developing state 
                                                                                                                   
Ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement (Dec. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/fish_stocks_agreement_declarations.ht
m#EC 
 32. Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Mitropoulos and EC Commissioner Barrot in Agreement 
Across Wide-Ranging Agenda, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.imo.org/about/       
mainframe.asp?topic _id=1018&doc_id=4701. 
 33. It is also possible that the agreement is signed only by the EC or only by the EU 
Member States. 
 34. EC measures and legislation have mostly been based on the common market. 
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practice and law of the sea in relation to Arctic marine shipping. 
Following the 1969 trial transit of the ice-adapted oil tanker, the 
S.S. Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage,35 Canada unila-
terally responded to the threat of possible future foreign tanker 
transits by enacting the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.36 
The Act, which is still in force today, established a 100 nautical 
mile pollution prevention zone in Arctic waters and prohibited all 
deposits of waste by any person or ship except as provided in regu-
lations.37 The Act also authorized the Governor in Council (federal 
cabinet) to subdivide Arctic waters into shipping safety control 
zones and to pass regulations for the control of shipping within the 
zones, including construction, equipment, and crewing standards.38 
 Subsequent legal measures followed. Through a Shipping Safe-
ty Control Zones Order,39 Canada divided its Arctic waters into six-
teen shipping safety control zones. Through Arctic Shipping Pollu-
tion Prevention Regulations,40 Canada established a complex array 
of shipping control measures including a prohibition on the dis-
charge of oil or oily mixtures, with narrow exceptions such as en-
gine exhaust and for the purpose of saving the loss of a ship.41 
 To help the codification of the law of the sea “catch up” with the 
need to protect vulnerable Arctic waters from shipping pollution, 
Canada also worked multilaterally within the negotiations for the 
LOS Convention. Working together with the Soviet Union and the 
United States, Canada was successful in obtaining the insertion of 
Article 234 into the Convention, which recognizes the special legis-
lative and enforcement powers of coastal states to control marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered waters within the limits of the 
EEZ.42 
 The transit of the United States Coast Guard vessel, Polar Sea, 
through the Northwest Passage in August 1985, without officially 
seeking permission from Canada, raised further law of the sea ten-
sions, to which Canada responded.43 On September 10, 1985, Ex-
                                                                                                                   
 35. For a detailed discussion, see John Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan 
Voyages and Their Aftermath, in POLITICS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE 67-97 (F. 
Griffiths         ed., 1987).  
 36. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12 (1970) (Can.). 
 37. Id. § 4(1). 
 38. Id. §§ 11(1), 12. 
 39. Shipping Safety Control Zones Order, C.R.C. c. 356 (Can.). 
 40. Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C. c. 353 (Can.). 
 41. Id. § 29(c). 
 42. 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 
392-98 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1991).   
 43. For a further review of the incident and Canadian responses, see Suzanne 
Lalonde, Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of Readiness 38 
REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 49, 65-69 (2004). 
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ternal Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, formalized Canada’s sovereign-
ty claim over Arctic waters by announcing the drawing of straight 
baselines (effective January 1, 1986) around the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago.44 He also declared a governmental intention to con-
struct a Polar Class 8 icebreaker to ensure a greater Canadian 
presence in the North,45 but that icebreaker was never built. 
 The international legal validity of enclosing the Canadian Arc-
tic Archipelago with straight baselines remains contentious. The 
United States, the EC, and other countries lodged formal protests 
against Canada’s action.46 Whether Canada can justify its claim of 
internal waters status for the enclosed waters based upon their 
being historic waters is in doubt.47 Whether Canada’s straight 
baseline system meets law of the sea customary or convention re-
quirements has been subject to debate.48 
 A further law of the sea issue hovering over Canada’s Arctic 
waters is whether the Northwest Passage is a strait used for in-
ternational navigation. The United States and Canada have a 
long-standing dispute on that front, with the United States consi-
dering the Northwest Passage a strait subject to the LOS Conven-
tion’s transit passage regime,49 where coastal state controls would 
be very limited.50 Since the LOS Convention does not define what 
is meant by “used for international navigation,” there is room for 
argument. Various factors might be used to determine the level of 
required use, including, among others, the number of ships transit-
ing the strait, the shipping tonnage, and the number of flag states 
involved.51 Whether actual or potential use is necessary for a strait 
to qualify as “used for international navigation” may be a further 
point of contention.52 
 In 1988, Canada and the United States reached a “stalemate” 
                                                                                                                   
 44. Right Honourable Joe Clark, Can. Sec’y of State for External Affairs, Statement in 
the House of Commons on Canadian Sovereignty, 85/49 (Sept. 10, 1985). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See ERIK FRANCKX, MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: CANADIAN AND RUSSIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 133 (1993).   
 47. See DONAT PHARAND, CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW           
121-25 (1988).   
 48. See id. at 131-84; FRANCKX, supra note 46, at 104-07.   
 49. BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS: 
UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 73 (1992). 
 50. Pursuant to Article 42 of the LOS Convention, States bordering straits may only 
adopt marine safety and pollution laws giving effect to international regulations, and 
pursuant to Article 41, bordering States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships, but only after seeking and 
receiving IMO approval. 
 51. See Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, 
38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 3, 34-35 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 35-36. 
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agreement on Arctic cooperation.53 They agreed to set aside their 
jurisdictional dispute over the legal status of the Northwest Pas-
sage. The United States agreed that its icebreakers would be sub-
ject to Canadian consent for transits within waters claimed by 
Canada to be internal. The countries also agreed to share research 
information regarding the marine environment gained through 
icebreaker navigation. 
 Many questions still surround Article 234 of the LOS Conven-
tion. What is the precise meaning of waters covered by ice for most 
of the year? What is the significance of giving special coastal state 
powers only in the EEZ?  Some writers have suggested the EEZ 
limitation implies that coastal states are granted no greater pow-
ers over foreign ships than in the territorial sea,54 while another 
interpretation supports a bestowing of much broader powers, in-
cluding the right to unilaterally adopt special design, construction, 
crewing, and equipment requirements.55 Such interpretive ques-
tions may also relate to straits used for international navigation 
since Article 233 of the Convention, which seeks to safeguard the 
legal regime of straits, does not exempt straits from the application 
of Article 234.56 
 Canada has two ocean boundary disputes in the Arctic in addi-
tion to a disagreement with Denmark/Greenland over the owner-
ship of Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to 
dispute the location of the ocean boundary in the Beaufort Sea, 
with some 6250 square nautical miles of area having good poten-
tial for hydrocarbon deposits at stake.57 Canada maintains that the 
141st west meridian should be the boundary line, in light of 1825 
and 1867 treaties, while the United States has argued for a strict 
equidistance line.58 Canada and Denmark/Greenland, while deli-
mitating most of the continental shelf through a 1973 agreement, 
have yet to complete the northern portion of the boundary in the 
Lincoln Sea.59 Canada and Denmark/Greenland also dispute own-
                                                                                                                   
 53. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada on Artic Cooperation and Accompanying Notes, 28 I.L.M. 141 (1989) 
[hereinafter Agreement on Arctic Cooperation]. 
 54. See D.M. McRae & D.J. Goundrey, Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: 
The Extent of Article 234, 16 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 197, 221 (1982). 
 55. Pharand, supra note 51, at 47-48. 
 56. See Cynthia Lamson & David VanderZwaag, Arctic Waters: Needs and Options for 
Canadian-American Cooperation, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 49, 81 (1987). 
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App. C (2008). 
 58. Karen L. Lawson, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The 
United States-Canada Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 241-43 (1982). 
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ership of the uninhabited Hans Island, located in Nares Strait.60 
The island represents a tiny “gap” in the continental shelf delimi-
tation agreed to in 1973.61 
 Through the Oceans Act, Canada has brought its offshore ju-
risdictional zones into line with the LOS Convention. Canada has 
formally established a twelve nautical mile territorial sea,62 a 
twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone,63 a 200 nautical mile 
EEZ64 and a continental shelf of at least 200 nautical miles meas-
ured from the territorial sea baselines or to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.65 For Arctic waters, of course, those maritime 
zones extend outward from the straight baseline system estab-
lished in 1986 around the Arctic islands. 
 
B.  The Arctic Council and the Marine Environment 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
 During the Cold War, Arctic-wide cooperation was not possible, 
except in very limited policy areas, such as the conclusion of the 
1973 Polar Bear Treaty66 between the five Arctic range states. This 
was due to the fact that the two superpowers and their allies con-
fronted each other in the Arctic, which was estimated by many as 
one of the major military strategic hot spots during the Cold War. 
After all, NATO was a neighbor to the Soviet Union via Norway, 
and the United States and the Soviet Union shared a border in the 
Bering and Chukchi Seas. It was the perestroika and glasnost that 
opened up opportunities for pan-Arctic cooperation. Secretary-
General Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk in 1987 proposed pan-
Arctic cooperation in a number of fields, one of these being the pro-
tection of the Arctic environment. Inspired by Gorbachev’s speech 
outlining various areas for Arctic cooperation, Finland took the in-
itiative in 1989 for pan-Arctic co-operation in one of these policy 
areas, that of environmental protection; in 1991 the Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was adopted by the eight 
Arctic states by means of a declaration.67 
                                                                                                                   
 60. Id. 
 61. Oceans Act, S.C., 1996, c. 31 (Can.). 
 62. Id. § 4. 
 63. Id. § 10. 
 64. Id. § 13. 
 65. Id. § 17. 
 66.  Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ., Nov. 
15, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 13 (1973), available at  http://pbsg.npolar.no. 
 67. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy § 2.1(v), U.S.-Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-
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  The AEPS achieved one important thing. Even though the co-
operation itself was a fairly low-committal exercise with weak in-
stitutional structure, it enabled us to start thinking of societal and 
environmental problems for the first time from the Arctic perspec-
tive (rather than from the perspective of individual country’s 
northern or Arctic region) and tackle them with policy measures.  
 The AEPS is also vastly important for understanding the cur-
rent functioning of the Arctic Council,68 and the proposals to renew 
it, since, even though the Arctic cooperation ostensibly was trans-
formed from the AEPS to the Arctic Council during the transition-
al period of 1996-1998, the basic elements of the cooperation have 
been in place from 1991, with only slight changes taking place.  
 Even though there is a new mandate on sustainable develop-
ment in the Council, the AEPS had a task force on sustainable de-
velopment and utilization in the Arctic, which had more ambitious 
goals than the present Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG).69 There are still the same participants in the cooperation, 
although the Declaration establishing the Council strengthened 
the status of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations as perma-
nent participants with power to influence decision-making (they 
were observers in the AEPS). The same institutional structure has 
been retained, ministerial meetings convened every two years and 
senior arctic officials (SAOs) managing the day-to-day activities of 
the Council. The four environmental protection working groups of 
the AEPS, namely Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
(CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and 
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), were 
integrated into the structure of the Council. In addition, two new 
working groups were established, the SDWG and the Arctic Con-
taminants Action Program (ACAP).  
 To date, there is no permanent secretariat in the Council, as 
was the case in the AEPS, although the three Scandinavian states 
have agreed to maintain the secretariat in Tromsø till 2012.70 As 
                                                                                                                   
 68. See Joint Communiqué and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Coun-
cil, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Russ.-Swed., Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382 (1996) [here-
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 69. Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) identified five 
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was the case in the AEPS, there is no permanent, mandatory fund-
ing mechanism in the Council, although a project support instru-
ment has been created to pool resources for funding of individual 
projects.71 Finally, and importantly, both the AEPS and the Arctic 
Council were established via a declaration as soft-law organiza-
tions, not inter-governmental organizations having binding        
decision-making power.  
 Hence, even though many have cherished the argument that 
the Council can be formalized into an inter-governmental organi-
zation, given that Arctic cooperation has already once been revised 
in its short life-cycle, it is important to keep in mind that the foun-
dation of the cooperation has remained much the same, allowing 
us to conclude that the Arctic Council is fairly resistant    to 
change.  
 But even though the structure has remained much the same, 
the Arctic Council has become a stronger forum for cooperation 
over the years of its existence. In addition to the changes identified 
above, the working groups have become stronger in status and in 
terms of their deliverables. This is due to the fact that it was 
bound to take a few years before these working groups could start 
functioning effectively. Increasingly, their strategies and delive-
rables have become more ambitious. The Council ministers have 
also adopted important, albeit not very strong, policy recommenda-
tions connected with major scientific assessments, such as the 
ACIA. After the release of the ACIA, climate change considerations 
have become a cross-cutting issue in the Council, placing pressure 
on the working groups to adjust their work to future challenges. 
There is also more interest in the work of the Council; major states 
(like China) are interested in becoming observers. 
 
2.   The Role of the EU 
 
 The EU plays an important role in the Council even though it 
participates only as an ad hoc observer. Three of the eight Arctic 
Council members are Member States of the Union; namely Fin-
land, Sweden and Denmark. Moreover, seven out of the eight non-
Arctic states observers to the Council are Member States of the 
Union: Italy (ad hoc status), Spain, France, the Netherlands, Pol-
and, Germany, and the United Kingdom, who are increasingly de-
                                                                                                                   
Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006-2012, http://arctic-
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manding a better position in the Council.72 The current Arctic 
Council chair, Norway, is trying to meet these expectations in its 
chair-period by enhancing their participation in the work of the 
Council.73 As studied below, the Commission is currently planning 
its future Arctic policy, which may lead to the EU demanding a 
better position in the Arctic Council.  
 
3.   The Role of Canada 
 
 Canada played a leadership role in creating the Arctic Council. 
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney proposed the idea of the 
Council during a visit to Leningrad in November 1989.74 In No-
vember 1990, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Joe Clark, declared that he would bring the issue of the Arctic 
Council to the attention of the other States.75 On September 19, 
1996, Canada hosted a meeting in Ottawa where representatives 
from the eight Arctic states signed the Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of the Arctic Council.76 
 Canada continues to play an active role in Arctic Council ad-
ministration and project activities. Canada recently vice-chaired 
the PAME Working Group.77 Canada, along with the United States 
and Finland, is leading the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(AMSA).78 Canada, together with Iceland, took a lead role in up-
dating and revising the Arctic Regional Programme of Action for 
the  Protect ion  o f  the  Marine  Environment  from                 
Land-based Activities.79 
 While Norway, as part of its chairmanship, has committed to 
reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Arctic Council,80 
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Canada has not taken an active role in trying to envision the fu-
ture of the Council. Academic commentary in Canada has been 
critical of the Canadian Government’s disproportionate emphasis 
on national defense and security, the marginalization of circumpo-
lar diplomacy, and the lack of a leadership role in promoting re-
gional cooperation.81 One Canadian author has urged development 
of a national Arctic strategy that, among other things, should ad-
dress ways to bring the Arctic Council into the                  
twenty-first century.82 
 
III.  SHIFTING SEASCAPE 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 As discussed above, the Arctic Council is the predominant in-
ter-governmental forum dealing with the Arctic in general, includ-
ing also Arctic marine issues. The Council has done important as-
sessment work (sometimes with policy recommendations) relating 
to the Arctic Ocean and produced non-legally binding guidelines 
and manuals of good practice. These have often been influential in 
many international environmental protection processes. Of the 
Arctic Council Working Groups, the most important marine policy 
work is done by PAME.  
 PAME’s agenda has become increasingly ambitious with the 
adoption of its 2004 Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP), which 
encourages actions on many fronts.83 PAME developed the AMSP 
through the various Arctic Council working groups and mechan-
isms, as well as via regional and global bodies.84 The AMSP identi-
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fies the largest drivers of change in the Arctic to be climate change 
and increasing economic activity and suggests actions in many 
areas, for instance: conducting a comprehensive assessment of Arc-
tic marine shipping, which led to the AMSA being finalized in 
2009; developing guidelines and procedures for port reception facil-
ities for ship-generated wastes and residues; examining the ade-
quacy of Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 
with revision, in 2009; identifying potential areas where new 
guidelines and codes of practice for the marine environment are 
needed; promoting application of the ecosystem approach; promot-
ing the establishment of marine protected areas, including a rep-
resentative network; calling for periodic reviews of both interna-
tional and regional agreements and standards; and promoting im-
plementation of contaminant-related conventions or programs and 
possible additional global and regional actions. 
 Overall, the Council has clear strengths. It now serves as a 
high-level platform for all the Arctic, internationally oriented, ac-
tors (not those who actually govern the Arctic, such as the Arctic 
sub-units of federal states and other administrative units).85 It has 
also produced scientific assessments, mainly via its strongest 
working group, AMAP, which has made a significant difference to 
regional and even global environmental negotiation processes.86 
The Council is also the only inter-governmental forum that accords 
indigenous peoples a very strong status as permanent participants 
(not NGOs as they are usually deemed).87 
 Yet, it must be acknowledged that with the present weak insti-
tutional structure, lack of any permanent funding mechanism, lack 
of legal status, etc., the Council cannot reasonably be expected to 
continue to be more than a platform for discussions on Arctic is-
sues and a producer of scientific assessments and non-legally bind-
ing guidelines, rather than a governing body. Hence, from the 
viewpoint of governing the Arctic Ocean (or Arctic marine areas in 
general) and the coming climate change challenges, it is fairly 
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clear that the Arctic Council is limited with its present structure 
and mandate.  
 
B.  Challenges to the Present Regime from the Part of Observers to 
the Arctic Council 
 
 Increasingly, scholars, as well as international and non-
governmental organizations that are observers to the Council, 
have started to criticize the way it conducts its work in general 
and its environmental protection mandate, in particular. The vari-
ous processes by IUCN, WWF Arctic, UNEP Grid-Arendal and 
Arctic parliamentarians that have studied the possibility of an 
Arctic treaty have ended up with recommendations containing two 
features: an audit to assess the effectiveness and relevance of ex-
isting regimes as a basis for the second step and a discussion con-
cerning the possibility of developing an Arctic treaty.88 In their 
August 2006 meeting in Kiruna, the Conference of Arctic Parlia-
mentarians asked that their governments and the institutions of 
the European Union, “‘[i]n light of the impact of climate change, 
and the increasing economic and human activity, initiate, as a 
matter of urgency, an audit of existing legal regimes that impact 
the Arctic and to continue the discussion about strengthening or 
adding to them where necessary.”89 
 In a seminar co-hosted by UNEP, Grid-Arendal, and the Stand-
ing Committee of the Arctic Parliamentarians on Multilateral 
Agreements and Their Relevance to the Arctic, in September 2006, 
the participants agreed on one overall recommendation: 
 
The participants of the Arendal Seminar recommend 
that UNEP, the Arctic Parliamentarians, the Arctic 
Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and Con-
tracting Parties, governing bodies and secretariats to 
the MEAs [multilateral environmental agreements] 
support and cooperate on an audit to assess the effec-
tiveness and relevance of MEAs in the Arctic and to 
examine the need and options for improving the exist-
ing regime as well as the need and options for devel-
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oping an Arctic Treaty or Arctic Framework Conven-
tion. The audit should take into account recommen-
dations from the Kiruna Conference of the Parlia-
mentarians  o f  the  Arct ic  Region and the                   
Arendal Seminar.90 
 
 A similar conclusion was reached by the IUCN, which convened 
an expert meeting in Ottawa on March 24-25, 2004 to discuss 
whether the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) could provide the 
needed input for the development of environmental protection in 
the Arctic. The expert meeting was divided over the way in which 
environmental protection could and should be developed in the 
Arctic and whether a treaty approach was needed. The main ap-
proach to Arctic governance advanced at the meeting was not to 
borrow from the Antarctic experience but to first study which envi-
ronmental threats to the Arctic should be addressed at which level: 
i.e., universal (global treaties and processes), regional (the Arctic 
Council), bilateral, national and sub-national.91  
 Hence, there clearly seems to be pressure from the abovemen-
tioned commentators of the Arctic Council to at least examine the 
applicable treaties carefully, studying in particular how these trea-
ties are implemented in the region and whether, on the basis of 
that analysis, a comprehensive/framework instrument for the Arc-
tic is called for. What these actions by observers of the Arctic 
Council serve to demonstrate is that pressures are building to 
adopt a treaty approach. Yet, the ultimate problem for those who 
push for an Arctic treaty is that, at least at present, there are no 
real signs from the Council and its member states that they would 
be ready to support the treaty approach, at least in the               
immediate future. 
 
C.  Recent Initiatives from the United States and the Arctic Ocean 
Coastal States 
 
 There are interesting recent developments, some of which can 
be seen even as challenging the Arctic Council as the main inter-
governmental platform for governing the Arctic Ocean.  
 For many parts of the Arctic Ocean, the presence of ice for most 
of the year has, so far, rendered national fisheries regulation for 
those areas unnecessary. But, as diminishing ice-coverage may at-
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tract fishing vessels looking for possible new fishing opportunities, 
Arctic states may be required to develop national regulations in 
order to discharge their obligations under international law, in-
cluding those under the LOS Convention and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. The United States is currently engaged in this process 
with regard to fishing in the maritime zones off Alaska north of 
the Bering Strait. In the United States, competence over fisheries 
is shared by the individual states (in this case Alaska) within three 
nautical miles from shore, and the federal government in the re-
mainder of the United States maritime zones. The North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) plays a key role in federal 
regulation with regard to the maritime zones of the United States 
in the North Pacific. The NPFMC has adopted various fishery 
management plans (FMPs) that apply as far north as the Bering 
Strait, and its King and Tanner Crab and Scallop FMPs also apply 
to that part of the Chukchi Sea that lies between the Bering Strait 
and Point Hope. In June 2007, the NPFMC closed the Northern 
Bering Sea to bottom trawling and directed a research plan to be 
developed for that area.92  
 Since October 2006, the NPFMC has also specifically focused 
its attention on Arctic fishery management. This has led to the de-
velopment of an Arctic FMP which is likely to be adopted at the 
February 2009 meeting of the Council. The Draft Arctic FMP pro-
poses, inter alia, to “close the Arctic to commercial fishing until 
information improves so that fishing can be conducted sustainably 
and with due concern to other ecosystem components.”93 
 As some of the fish stocks in the EEZ off Alaska are likely to be 
transboundary, reference should be made to United States Senate 
joint resolution (S.J. Res.) No. 17 of 2008, directing the United 
States to “. . . initiate international discussions and take necessary 
steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or 
agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and strad-
dling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean. . . .”94 The House of Repre-
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at 2, available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/newsletters/news1208.pdf. 
 94. S.J. Res. 17-2, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) (passed by the House of Representa-
tives on May 21, 2008, and signed by President George W. Bush on June 3, 2008, thereafter 
Pub. L. No. 110-243, 122 Stat. 1569). 
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sentatives voted in favor of S.J. Res. No. 17 in May 2007, and the 
President signed it on June 4, 2008. The current United States 
Administration has so far informed Canada and the Russian Fed-
eration of SJ Res. No. 17 of 2008, and has expressed its willingness 
to engage in exploratory talks on the issue. The United States also 
brought S.J. Res. No. 17 of 2008 to the attention of SAOs during 
their meeting in November 2007. During the discussion that fol-
lowed “[t]here was strong support for building on and considering 
this issue within the context of existing mechanisms.”95 This would 
seem to indicate that a considerable majority of the Arctic states 
does not want the Arctic Council to become directly involved in fi-
shery management and conservation.  
 Pursuant to S.J. Res. No. 17 of 2008, the United States has also 
approached a number of relevant players, including the other Arc-
tic Ocean coastal states, on their willingness to support a process 
which would culminate in a general statement or declaration on 
present and future Arctic fisheries. At the Session of the Commit-
tee on Fisheries (COFI) of the United Nations Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO) in March 2009, the United States plans 
to convene a side event to discuss this process. The United States 
may approach another Arctic Ocean coastal state, for instance 
Norway, to co-sponsor this initiative. At this side event, the United 
States may offer to host a high-level conference on Arctic fisheries 
in 2010, during which such a general statement or declaration 
could be adopted.96 The European Commission’s Arctic Communi-
cation97 would seem to be supportive of such an initiative.98 Final-
ly, it should be mentioned that on January 9, 2009, President Bush 
approved the long-awaited Arctic Region Policy99 of the            
United States.  
 Perhaps the most significant development in regard to manag-
ing the Arctic Ocean comes from the part of the five Arctic Ocean 
coastal states. They started their cooperation with the meeting be-
tween senior officials in October 2007 in Norway. This was fol-
lowed by the May 2008 meeting in Greenland, where the political 
                                                                                                                   
 95. ARCTIC COUNCIL, MEETING OF SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS: FINAL REPORT 12 (2007),  
available at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Narvik%20-FINAL%20Report-%2023Apr08.doc.  
 96. Information based on conversations between Erik J. Molenaar and a governmen-
tal official of the United States in December 2008 and January 2009. Presidential Policy 
Directive, supra note 22, § III(H)(6), does not refer to the possibility of such a process in the 
relevant implementation section.  
 97. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763 (Nov. 20, 2008) 
[hereinafter Arctic Region Communication]. 
 98. It is observed “[u]ntil a conservation and management regime is in place for the 
areas not yet covered by such a regime, no new fisheries should commence.”  Id. at 8. 
 99. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 22. 
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representatives of these countries outlined an agenda for action. In 
their conference declaration (Ilulissat Declaration) they note that 
they “. . . see no need to develop a new comprehensive internation-
al legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” but are willing to work 
within the framework of existing treaties and institutions, espe-
cially the law of the sea.100 Yet, they did outline several areas for 
future cooperating including work through the IMO against ship-
based pollution, strengthening their search and rescue capabilities, 
cooperation in sharing data on continental shelf, etc. Interestingly, 
they also affirmed their intent to continue in the Arctic Council, 
but also in other relevant forums, signaling that they indeed may 
pursue a new form of cooperation focusing on the Arctic Ocean.  
 This new incipient form of cooperation, if it really takes off, 
may over time challenge the Arctic Council, in that the other three 
members of the Council have not been invited to these two meet-
ings. It may be that with the melting ice, the Arctic Ocean coastal 
state cooperation will grow stronger, given that there a is need to 
take stronger policy actions in higher stake policy areas (fisheries 
and shipping) than those that can be pursued in the Arctic Council 
with respect to the Arctic marine area, in particular the Arctic 
Ocean. This move by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states has al-
ready caused friction between them and the three Council mem-
bers not invited to the Greenland meeting. In the Narvik SAO 
meeting, Iceland expressed concern over why the Arctic Council 
members were not invited.101 On the other hand, just before the 
Greenland meeting, Denmark briefed the SAOs that the meeting 
would not compete with the Arctic Council.102 
 
D.  EU Arctic Policy Developments 
 
 In connection with its climate policy work, the EU also pro-
                                                                                                                   
      100. Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7, at 2.  
      101. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 20 (providing that Iceland “expressed 
concerns that separate meetings of the five Arctic states, Denmark, Norway, US, Russia and 
Canada, on Arctic issues without the participation of the members of the Arctic Council, 
Sweden, Finland and Iceland, could create a new process that competes with the objectives 
of the Arctic Council. If issues of broad concern to all of the Arctic Council Member States, 
including the effect of climate change, shipping in the Arctic, etc. are to be discussed, 
Iceland requested that Denmark invite the other Arctic Council states to participate in the 
ministerial meeting. Permanent participants also requested to participate in the meeting. 
Denmark responded that the capacity of the venue may be an issue.”).  
      102. In the Svolvaer SAO meeting (23-24.4.2008), it was provided that “Denmark 
updated on preparations for its meeting of the 5 Arctic coastal states. The meeting will focus 
on issues of concern for the 5 states and is intended to strengthen, and not compete with, 
other relevant fora. PPs inquired as to their role in the meeting and Denmark confirmed 
that the conference is intended for governments”. See 2008 ARCTIC COUNCIL SENIOR 
REPORT, supra note 80, at 15. 
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posed to revisit the governance framework applicable to the Arctic 
marine area.103 The Climate Change and International Security 
paper identified one policy option to “[d]evelop an EU Arctic policy 
based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into 
account, [inter alia], access to resources and the opening of new 
trade routes.”104 The EU is also developing its Arctic policy as part 
of its newly adopted integrated maritime policy wherein the Com-
mission (DG Mare) promises to produce a report “on strategic is-
sues relating to the Arctic Ocean” within the year 2008.105  
 Most recently, the Commission issued its Arctic Communica-
tion.106 In the Introduction to the thirteen page document, the 
Commission sets out EU interests and proposes action for EU 
Member States and institutions around three main                     
policy objectives:  
 
• Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with               
its population 
• Promoting sustainable use of resources 
• Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance107 
 
 The Communication is structured along these three main poli-
cy objectives. One of the salient features within “[p]romoting sus-
tainable use of resources” is the proposal to extend the spatial 
scope of the NEAFC Convention (see subsection IV.B.). As the sec-
tion “[c]ontributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” is 
of most interest for this paper, some more attention is devoted to it 
                                                                                                                   
      103. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE & EUR. COMM’N TO EU. COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ 
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf. 
      104. Id. at 11. See also id. at 8, which states, “[t]he Arctic: [t]he rapid melting of the 
polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international 
trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources 
in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential con-
sequences for international stability and European security interests. The resulting new 
strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the Russian flag under the North 
Pole. There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims and 
access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe's ability to effec-
tively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its rela-
tions with key partners.” 
      105. The adopted integrated maritime policy provides that, “[a]ttention will also be 
given to the geopolitical implications of climate change. In this context, the Commission will 
present in 2008 a report on strategic issues relating to the Arctic Ocean”. Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An Integrated Maritime Policy for the 
European Union, at §4.4, COM (2007) 574 final (Oct. 10, 2007), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUrierv.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF [here-
inafter Integrated Maritime Policy]. 
      106. See Arctic Region Communication, supra note 97. 
      107.   Id. at 3. 
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here. As a general comment, it should be noted that the section 
contains quite a few sentences that would raise the eyebrows of 
international lawyers and would have benefited from more accu-
rate drafting. The section contains the following policy objectives: 
 
• The EU should work to uphold the further develop-
ment of a cooperative Arctic governance system based 
on the UNCLOS which would ensure: 
o security and stability 
o strict environmental management, including 
respect of the precautionary principle 
o sustainable use of resources as well as open 
and equitable access 
• The full implementation of already existing obliga-
tions, rather than proposing new legal instruments 
should be advocated. This however should not prec-
lude work on further developing some of the frame-
works, adapting them to new conditions or Arctic spe-
cificities. 
• The EU should promote broad dialogue and nego-
tiated solutions and not support arrangements which 
exclude any of the Arctic EU Member States or Arctic 
EEA EFTA countries. 
• Arctic considerations should be integrated into wider 
EU policies and negotiations.108 
 
 Subsequently, a list of policy actions is offered. These include: 
 
• Explore the possibility of establishing new, multi-sector 
frameworks for integrated ecosystem management. This 
could include the establishment of a network of marine pro-
tected areas, navigational measures and rules for ensuring 
the sustainable exploitation of minerals. 
• Enhance input to the Arctic Council in accordance with the 
Community’s role and potential. As a first step, the Com-
mission will apply for permanent observer status in the 
Arctic Council. 
. . . . 
• Explore all possibilities at international level to promote 
measures for protecting marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, including through the pursuit 
of an UNCLOS Implementing Agreement. 
                                                                                                                   
      108.   Id. at 10.  
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• Work towards the successful conclusion of international ne-
gotiations on marine protected areas on the high seas.109 
 
 A few comments are offered here. First, the preference for im-
plementation “rather than proposing new legal instruments” in the 
section on policy objectives does not seem to be very absolute in 
view of the support for the “possibility of establishing new, multi-
sector frameworks for integrated ecosystem management.”110 The 
words “based on UNCLOS”, in the section on policy objectives, 
nevertheless, indicate that the option of an Implementing Agree-
ment under the LOS Convention is no longer being pursued. At the 
end of the discussion of this option, in subsection IV.E., some at-
tention is also devoted to an earlier EU proposal for an Implement-
ing Agreement under the LOS Convention. It is not altogether 
clear, however, why such an initiative with a global scope should 
be listed in this Arctic Communication. The same comment also 
applies to the last policy action that is quoted above. While the 
precise meaning and intention of this policy action is not clear,111 it 
seems to relate to a process at the global level that is intended to 
have output that applies throughout the globe and not just the 
Arctic. Or does it imply that the high seas in the Arctic Ocean 
should be designated as a marine protected area?  
 The European Parliament and individual Member States have 
also pressed for stronger positions in their Arctic policy. The Euro-
pean Parliament, in its resolution of October 9, 2008 on               
Arctic governance: 
 
Suggests that the Commission should be prepared to 
pursue the opening of international negotiations de-
signed to lead to the adoption of an international 
treaty for the protection of the Arctic, having as its 
inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by 
the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting 
the fundamental difference represented by the popu-
lated nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights 
and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic re-
gion; believes, however, that as a minimum starting-
point such a treaty could at least cover the unpopu-
lated and unclaimed area at the centre of the         
                                                                                                                   
      109. Id. at 11. 
      110. Id. 
      111. The sentences quoted in infra note 163 indicate that this policy action should have 
been merged with the policy action on the Implementation Agreement.  
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Arguably, however, priority in reform lies with areas within na-
tional jurisdiction because the impacts of climate change and the 
ensuing human activities will occur there first. Limiting reform to 
areas beyond national jurisdiction would place coastal states in a 
more advantageous position, vis-à-vis other states, due to lower 
costs/higher profits or transboundary effects. 
 The individual EU Member States that have a status of ob-
server to the Arctic Council, which form seven out of eight non-
Arctic states observers to the Council, have also started to demand 
a better position in the Arctic Council, some even suggesting to 
apply for membership.113  
 It can be asked whether the Arctic Ocean coastal state coopera-
tion can be seen as a threat from the perspective of the EU. The 
EU has participated in the ministers of the Council as an ad hoc 
observer, given that three of its member states (Finland, Sweden, 
and Denmark) are members of the Council. In addition, Iceland 
and Norway have to implement much of the EU regulation as par-
ties to the EEA agreement. On the other hand, it is important to 
note that Greenland, Svalbard, and their adjacent maritime zones 
are not covered by the EU or the EEA Agreement, since Greenland 
chose to exit the then EEC in 1985, following a referendum, and 
Svalbard was excluded from the EEA agreement given that it is 
governed by the international 1920 Svalbard Treaty.114 The EU, 
thus, does not have any Arctic coastline, but it does possess signifi-
cant fisheries and shipping interests in the opening new sea area, 
now studied under its climate policy and integrated maritime poli-
cy. If the Arctic Ocean coastal state cooperation continues in real, 
and Greenland self-rule from Denmark is increasing by the day, 
some even predicting independence in a foreseeable future,115 the 
                                                                                                                   
      112. EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA-PROV(2008)0474 3 (2008). 
      113. It was reported in Barents Observer, e.g., that “Italian Foreign Minister Franco 
Frattini said his country wants to become member of the organisation because of ‘the 
geopolitical and strategic importance of the Arctic region. . . .’ ”. Non-arctic Countries Want 
Membership in Arctic Council, BARENTSOBSERVER.COM, Oct. 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.barentsobserver.com/non-arctic-countries-want-membership-in-arctic-
council.4516094-16174.html [hereinafter Non-Arctic Countries]. 
      114. Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8.  A 
special Protocol was adopted as part of the EEA Agreement to the effect that Norway may 
decide whether to apply the EEA Agreement to Svalbard or not (Protocol 40). Norway de-
cided to exclude the Islands. See also GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY: FROM TERRA 
NULLIUS TO NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY 299 (1995). 
      115. See ArcticPortal.org, From Remote Island to Self-Government - Greenland’s 
Journey Towards Independence, http://arcticportal.org/features/2009/from-remote-island-to-
self-government-greenlands-journey-towards-independence (recent news release on Arctic 
Council’s website) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
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EU will find itself excluded from this cooperation altogether. 
Hence, it is one possible trajectory that the EU will continue to 
push for other kinds of governance arrangements, where it can 
play a more influential role than in the Arctic Council or in the 
Arctic Ocean coastal state cooperation. This would seem to prompt 
the EU to push for a more comprehensive Arctic legal governance 
arrangement, at least from the longer term perspective.  
 
E.  The Role of Canada 
 
 Canada has not been an advocate of formalizing regional coop-
eration among the Arctic Ocean coastal states, but instead has 
largely preferred bilateral cooperative arrangements.116 In 1983, 
Canada forged a marine environmental cooperation agreement 
with Denmark,117 which pledges the provision of information and 
consultation over proposed undertakings carrying a significant 
risk of transboundary pollution in the Nares Strait, Baffin Bay, 
and Davis Strait region. The agreement has also established joint 
marine contingency plans for pollution incidents from shipping or 
offshore hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation. In 1977, Canada 
agreed with the United States to establish a joint marine contin-
gency plan for the Beaufort Sea and the plan has been periodically 
revised.118 Canada and the Russian Federation have entered into 
various agreements relating to environmental and                  
economic cooperation.119 
 In the wake of the Ilulissat Declaration, it seems likely that 
                                                                                                                   
      116. For a more detailed summary of Canada’s cooperative arrangements relating to 
marine environmental protection and living marine resource management, see R. Siron, 
David L. VanderZwaag & H. Fast, Ecosystem-based Ocean Management in the Canadian 
Arctic, in BEST PRACTICES IN ECOSYSTEM-BASED OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC 
(Hakon Hoel ed., Norwegian Polar Inst., Report Series No. 129, Tromsø, Nor. 2009) 
(published under the auspices of the Arctic Council). 
      117.  Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, Can.-Den., Aug. 
26, 1983, 1983 Can. T.S. No. 19. 
      118. Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
the United States of America Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a 
Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, July 28, 1977, 1977 Can. T.S. No. 25. 
      119. See Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between Canada and the Russian 
Federation, June 19, 1992, 1993 Can. T.S. No. 23; Canada-Russian Federation Agreement 
Concerning Environmental Cooperation, May 8, 1993, 1993 Can. T.S. No. 7; Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
Cooperation in the Arctic and the North, June 19, 1992, 1992 Can. T.S. No. 18; Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
Economic Cooperation, May 8, 1993, 1994 Can. T.S. No. 38; Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Canada) and the 
Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation on 
Aboriginal and Northern Development, Nov. 29, 2007, available at http://www.ain-
inac.gc.ca/ap/pubs/mourus/mourus-eng.asp. 
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Canada and the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states will, at least 
in the near term, avoid a comprehensive regional sea agreement120 
in favor of sectoral cooperative initiatives. For example, a regional 
agreement on search and rescue may become a priority in light of 
increased Arctic shipping.121 Working through the IMO to better 
protect the Arctic marine environment from vessel-source pollution 
has already been occurring through the revision process122 for the 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters.123 
Further regional cooperation may follow in light of recommenda-
tions from the AMSA. Designating the Arctic Ocean, or parts the-
reof, as a special area, where stricter than normal pollution stan-
dards for oil, noxious liquid substances and garbage would apply, 
is a possible governance avenue.124 
 On the domestic front, Canada has substantially shifted, under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, towards a sove-
reignty and security agenda for the Arctic. To defend Canadian 
sovereignty over the Arctic, the Government has committed to con-
structing up to eight Polar Class Arctic offshore patrol ships able 
to patrol the length of the Northwest Passage during the summer 
navigable season and its approaches year round.125 Establishing a 
Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut 
and constructing a docking and refueling facility in Nanisivik, Nu-
navut to serve as a staging area for naval vessels and Canadian 
Coast Guard vessels operating in the North are further commit-
ments.126 In the 2008 Budget, the Government pledged $720 mil-
                                                                                                                   
      120. For a recent call for such an agreement, see Louise Angélique de La Fayette, 
Ocean Governance in the Arctic, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 531 (2008). 
      121. Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7 (highlighting the need to further strengthen 
search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic Ocean). Ministers at the Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council on April 29, 2009, through the Tromsø Declara-
tion, approved the establishment of a task force to negotiate by the next Ministerial meeting 
in 2011 an international instrument on search and rescue in the Arctic.  
      122. A correspondence group under the coordination of Canada was established to 
revise the Guidelines and the Guidelines have been extended to cover Antarctic waters as 
well. IMO, Mar. Safety Comm., Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth 
Session, Annex 18, MSC 86/26/Add.2 (2009). 
      123. IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 1056, MEPC/Circ. 399 (Dec. 23, 2002). 
      124. The technical report on Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping, prepared for 
AMSA, suggested as one option designating the Arctic Ocean beyond national jurisdiction, 
as a special area.  VANDERZWAAG, supra note 57, at Finding 11. The AMSA Report 
subsequently recommended that Arctic states explore the need for special area designations 
through the IMO. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT      
7 (2009). 
      125. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
Announces New Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships: Canada’s New Government to Move Forward 
With Deep Water Port in Arctic (July 9, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/               
media.asp?category=1&id=1742. 
      126. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Prime Minister Announces 
Expansion of Canadian Forces Facilities and Operations in the Arctic (Aug. 10, 2007), 
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lion CDN for the construction of a new Polar Class icebreaker.127 
In August 2008, the Prime Minister announced the Government’s 
intention to extend the coverage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act beyond the present 100 nautical miles to 200 nautical 
miles and to require mandatory reporting from all ships destined 
for Arctic waters within the same 200 nautical miles zone.128 
 Getting a firm grip on future directions for Canadian Arctic 
policy is not easy since the Government has largely favoured an 
incremental approach to policy formulation. In the October 2007 
Throne Speech, Stephen Harper pledged to bring forward an inte-
grated northern strategy having four pillars, namely, strengthen-
ing Canada’s sovereignty, protecting the environment, promoting 
economic and social development, and improving and developing 
northern governance.129 The speech also announced that Canada 
would build a world-class Arctic research station to serve the world 
in cutting edge issues, including environmental science and re-
source development.130 
 The location and parameters of the proposed Arctic research 
station remain uncertain. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
prepared a Visioning Workshop Report on proposed scientific prior-
ities for the station.131 The department then commissioned an in-
ternational panel of experts to provide a critique of the document 
and further advise on future directions for Arctic research. In an 
October 2008 report, the panel suggested a change in terminology 
from “research station,” implying “a physical structure—or cluster 
of structures” to a broader term, “Canadian Arctic Research Initia-
tive.”132 The panel concluded that such an initiative “will likely re-
quire a two-hub model with a logistical hub in a central, accessible 
location as well as a scientific hub in an attractive and scientifical-
ly interesting area.”133 The need for a “transparent decision-
                                                                                                                   
available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp? category+1&id=1784. 
      127. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Northern Strategy – Backgrounder 
(Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2016. 
      128. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, PM Announces Government of 
Canada Will Extend Jurisdiction over Arctic Waters (Aug. 27 2008), available at 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2248. An Act to amend the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act, 2009 S.C., ch. 11 (Can.), receiving Royal Assent on 11 June 2009 
and coming into force on August 1, 2009, subsequently formalized the extension. 
      129. Stephen Harper, Can. Prime Minister, Strong Leadership. A Better Canada. 
Address from the Throne to Open Second Session of the 37th Parliament of Canada (Oct.       
16, 2007). 
      130. Id. 
      131. INT’L EXPERT PANEL ON SCI. PRIORITIES FOR CAN. ARCTIC RES. INITIATIVE, VISION 
FOR THE CANADIAN ARCTIC RESEARCH INITIATIVE: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITIES             
app. A (2008). 
      132. Id. at 4. 
      133. Id. at 16. 
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making process” by which possible models and sites are considered 
and chosen was emphasized.134 
 Only in July 2009 did the Government of Canada release a 
Northern  Strategy document,135 but the document remains quite 
general and vague on future international policy directions for the 
Arctic. For example, the Northern Strategy states that Canada 
will continue to manage its maritime boundary and jurisdictional 
disputes with the United States and Denmark in a cooperative 
manner and may seek to resolve them in the future in accordance 
with international law.136 While the Strategy emphasizes Canada’s 
commitment to ensuring the Arctic Council has the necessary 
strength, resources, and influence to respond effectively to emerg-
ing challenges, no detailed vision for the Council is provided.137 
One can expect Canada’s policy to evolve through further speeches 
and funding initiatives.138 
 
IV.  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 A range of options for strengthening ocean governance in the 
Arctic exist. “Soft law” approaches include, among others: harmo-
nization of environmental and technical standards by coastal 
states in key sectors such as shipping, fishing, and hydrocarbon 
exploration/exploitation; development of integrated ocean planning 
initiatives for transboundary marine ecosystems, for example, the 
Barents, Beaufort, and Bering Seas;139 and restructuring the Arctic 
Council, including by broadening participation.140  
 Various “hard law” approaches have also been proposed, in-
                                                                                                                   
      134. Id. at 17. On February 20, 2009, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
 Development, the Honourable Chuck Strahl, announced the undertaking of a feasibility 
study for the proposed Arctic research station with three locations in Nunavut being 
considered – Cambridge Bay, Pond Inlet, and Resolute. See Indian & N. Aff. Can., 
Feasibility Study for Canada’s new High Arctic Research Station, http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/nth/st/fs-eng.asp?p1=1036190&p2=1064486 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). 
      135. GOV’T OF CAN., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR 
FUTURE (2009), available at http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp. 
      136. See id. at 7. 
      137. See id. at 15. 
      138. The government’s website, Gov’t of Can., Canada’s Northern 
Strategy, www.northernstrategy.gc.ca (last visited Jan. 22, 2010, will need to be consulted 
to track the various updates. 
      139. The PAME Working Group has already established a Large Marine Ecosystem 
Expert Group and PAME has committed to moving the ecosystem approach forward in three 
pilot areas, namely the West Bering, Barents and Beaufort Seas. See PROGRAM FOR PROT. 
OF ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, DRAFT WORKING GROUP MEETING REPORT NO. I-2008                      
16-17 (2008). 
      140. See Non-Arctic Countries, supra note 113. 
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cluding, among others: negotiating a regional seas agreement with 
protocols;141 establishing a new regional ocean management organ-
ization for governing areas beyond national jurisdiction;142 trans-
forming the Arctic Council into a treaty-based organization;143 and 
forging sectoral agreements for particular priorities such as search 
and rescue and joint marine contingency planning.144  
 Rather than canvassing the full spectrum of governance op-
tions, the remainder of the discussion focuses on a few select op-
tions, namely adjusting the spatial scope of the NEAFC Conven-
tion (subsection IV.B.), adjusting the spatial scope of the OSPAR 
Convention (subsection IV.C.), and an Implementing Agreement 
under the LOS Convention (subsection IV.D.). Finally, subsection 
IV.E. concludes by highlighting the arguments for and against a 
new, international, legally binding instrument for the governance 
and regulation of the Arctic Ocean.  
 
B.  Adjusting the Spatial Scope of the NEAFC Convention 
 
 One of the options for addressing gaps in the regime for the go-
vernance and regulation of marine capture fisheries is the devel-
opment of one or more state-of-the-art RFMOs or Arrangements 
for species other than tuna, tuna-like species, and anadromous 
species. This may require adjustments in the competence of exist-
ing RFMOs or Arrangements, in particular in geographical terms. 
An obvious candidate for a spatial adjustment is the North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), established by the 
NEAFC Convention.145 The five existing members of NEAFC are 
the European Community (EC), Denmark on behalf of the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federa-
tion. Unlike the OSPAR Convention,146 the NEAFC Convention 
does not explicitly mention the option of amending its spatial 
scope. On the other hand, there is also nothing in Article 19, or 
elsewhere in the NEAFC Convention that would preclude spatial 
adjustments, as such. 
 It should be noted that the NEAFC Convention’s eastern boun-
                                                                                                                   
      141. See de La Fayette, supra note 120. 
      142. Rosemary Rayfuse, Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a 
Warming World, 16(2) RECIEL 196 (2007); Rosemary Rayfuse, Protecting Marine 
Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 17(1) RECIEL 3 (2008). 
      143. Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New 
Proposal, 17(1) RECIEL 14 (2008). 
      144. The Ilulissat Declaration has already emphasized that search and rescue 
cooperations are likely to become a high priority in light of increased Arctic support. See 
Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7. 
      145. NEAFC, supra note 8, art. 3. 
      146. OSPAR Convention, supra note 9. 
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dary and the western boundary north of Greenland do not coincide 
with the two relevant boundaries of FAO Statistical Area No. 18, 
entitled “Arctic Sea.” While the spatial scope of the NEAFC Con-
vention is identical to the spatial scope of its 1959 predecessor,147 
the two relevant boundaries of FAO Statistical Area No. 18 al-
ready existed in 1970 and have not changed since then.148 The spa-
tial scope of the OSPAR Convention and its two predecessors, the 
Oslo Convention149 and the Paris Convention,150 is also identical to 
that of the NEAFC Convention (and its 1959 predecessor). Interes-
tingly, the ICES Convention151 stipulates that the spatial mandate 
of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
is “the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas”152 but the northern 
boundaries of the ICES Areas are identical to those of FAO Statis-
tical Area No. 18. 
 The rationale for the northern boundaries of the predecessor to 
the NEAFC Convention is not evident. Perhaps they simply de-
marcated the most northerly range of distribution that commer-
cially significant fish stocks could possibly have, in the most opti-
mistic scenario, and then moved just a bit further north to be on 
the safe side. It should also be noted that until recently the exact 
location of the northern boundaries did not have practical rele-
vance for NEAFC. 
 While spatial adjustments are thus possible, it is submitted 
that only relatively small geographical adjustments, expansions as 
well as shrinkages, do not seem problematic. Such adjustments 
could, for instance, follow maritime boundaries or ecosystem boun-
daries between different hydrographic regimes, submarine topo-
graphy, and distributional ranges of certain target species or other 
species.153 A well-known example of an international regulatory 
regime whose spatial scope was mainly determined by ecosystem 
boundaries is the CCAMLR Convention, by which the Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
                                                                                                                   
      147. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention art. 1, Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S.           
157 (1964). 
      148. See the historical FAO statistical charts at FAO Fisheries & Agric. Dep’t, Fishing 
Area Maps, ftp.fao.org/fi/maps/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
      149. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and 
Aircraft art. 2, Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3 (1974). 
      150. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources art. 
2, June 4, 1974, 1546 U.N.T.S. 120 (1989). 
      151. Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Sept. 12 
1964, 652 U.N.T.S. 237 (1968). 
      152. Id. art. 2.  
      153. See Lewis M. Alexander, Large Marine Ecosystems as Global Management Units, 
in BIOMASS YIELDS AND GEOGRAPHY OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS 339, 339-42 (Kenneth 
Sherman & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1989). 
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(CCAMLR) was established.154 Even in that case, however, the ap-
proximation of the Antarctic Convergence agreed to during the ne-
gotiation of the CCAMLR Convention took account of political con-
siderations, thereby causing a small diversion from pre-existing 
FAO Statistical Areas.155 
 For the purpose of adjusting the spatial scope of the NEAFC 
Convention, account could perhaps be taken of the large marine 
ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic marine area developed by 
PAME.156 A quick comparison of these LMEs with the current spa-
tial scope of the NEAFC Convention might suggest that, for in-
stance, the latter’s spatial scope could be expanded by including all 
of LME No. 20, entitled “Barents Sea,”157 and perhaps even LME 
No. 58, entitled “Kara Sea.”158 Another option would be to restrict 
the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention by excluding the spa-
tial scope of LME No. 64, entitled “Arctic Ocean.”159 The spatial 
scope of FAO Statistical Area No. 18 could then be                    
adjusted accordingly.160  
 A word of caution is warranted here, however. While the Arctic 
LMEs defined by PAME have taken account of “trophic relation-
ships,”161 this is quite different from a criterion such as “usefulness 
for conservation and management of target species.”162 And, even if 
the latter criterion were in fact used, the negotiations on the 
CCAMLR Convention illustrate that political considerations can 
override science-based criteria. Another political consideration 
would nevertheless attribute great weight to the LMEs defined by 
                                                                                                                   
      154. It is of course acknowledged that regimes for enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are 
also mainly or exclusively determined by ecosystem boundaries. 
      155. See James N. Barnes, The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in 
the Southern Ocean, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES: ISSUES IN 
MARINE POLLUTION AND THE EXPLOITATION OF ANTARCTICA 239, 261-62 (Jonathan I. Char-
ney ed., 1982) (observing that at the insistence of Argentina, the boundary was drawn fur-
ther away from Argentine territory in order to exclude the Drake Passage). FAO statistical 
charts were later modified accordingly. See FAO Fisheris & Agric. Dep’t, supra note 148; see 
also F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 218, 292 (1982). 
      156. These can be found at http://www.pame.is/ecosystem-approach. 
      157. Id.  
      158. Id. 
      159. Large Marine Ecosystems of the Arctic Region and Linked Watersheds, 
http://www.pame.is/ecosystem-approach (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
      160. The historical FAO statistical charts, supra note 148, indicate that this is a com-
mon practice. 
      161. PROGRAM FOR PROT. OF ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, WORKING GROUP MEETING REPORT 
NO: I-2006 11 (2006). 
      162. Erik J. Molenar, Artic Fisheries Conservation and Management: Initial Steps of 
Reform of the International Legal Framework 26, available at http://doc.nprb.org/web/ 
nprb/afs_2009/Molenaar%20Arctic%20Fisheries%20Conservation%20and%20Management
%20final%20version%20to%20YPL.pdf (text submitted to Yearbook of Polar Law           
March 2009). 
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PAME. This would be the wish to pursue integrated, cross-
sectoral, ecosystem based, ocean governance. 
 By contrast, large expansions, by which the NEAFC Conven-
tion Area would comprise the entire Arctic Ocean, as suggested in 
the EU Commission’s Arctic Communication,163 appear much more 
problematic. This is not so much caused by the interests of the new 
coastal states, namely Canada and the United States. In fact, 
Canada would not really be a new coastal state as it currently al-
ready has the status of Cooperating Non-Contracting Party (NCP) 
with NEAFC. In light of this status, Canada may even apply for 
full membership in the future. NEAFC’s existing spatial compe-
tence in the Atlantic sector of the Arctic, as well as potential ad-
justments of this spatial competence, do not appear to have played 
a role in Canada’s decision to apply for NCP status.164 This does 
not exclude, however, that such considerations could not play a 
role in the future.165 In case Canada would indeed apply for full 
membership, this would, at any rate, indicate its willingness to ac-
cept the substance of the NEAFC Convention, as modified by the 
2004 and 2006 amendments.166 It is less clear if the United States 
would have significant problems with the substance of the 
amended NEAFC Convention.  
 Perhaps more important, however, is whether or not Canada 
and the United States have fundamental objections to NEAFC’s 
practices on the establishment and allocation of the total allowable 
catch (TAC) for straddling fish stocks, for the reason that these 
clearly give preferential treatment to coastal states. The initiative 
lies here with the coastal states, who first agree on a coastal state 
TAC while taking account of the scientific advice provided by 
ICES.167 However, as the ICES advice relates to the entire stock, 
the coastal states effectively determine the high seas TAC as well. 
                                                                                                                   
      163. See Arctic Region Communication, supra note 97, at 8 (observing that “[i]n princi-
ple, extending the mandate of existing management organisations such as NEAFC is pref-
erable to creating new ones.”). 
      164. Email correspondence between Erik J. Molenaar and L. Ridgeway, Dir. Gen., Int’l 
Policy & Integration, Fisheries & Oceans Can. (Nov. 2008) (on file with author). 
      165. See generally NEAFC Convention, supra note 8, art. 19 (stating that once Canada 
is a member of NEAFC it can participate in decision making on proposals to adjust the spa-
tial scope of the NEAFC Convention; such decisions require a three-fourths majority). 
      166. See id. art. 19(4) (stating that if Canada would insist on acceding to the ‘old’ ver-
sion of the NEAFC Convention, this would not attract the necessary majority pursuant to 
Art. 20(4) of the NEAFC Convention). 
      167. E.g., Agreed Record of Conclusions of Fisheries Consultations Between Norway, 
the European Community and the Faroe Islands on the Management of Mackerel in the 
North-East Atlantic for 2008 [hereinafter 2008 Agreed Record], annex I, Nor.-Eur. Cmty.-
Faroe Is., Oct. 30, 2007, available at http://www.fisk.fo/Admin/public/DWSDownload 
.aspx?File=%2FFiles%2FFiler%2FFisk%2FPDF%2F301007_Makrelsemjan_2008.pdf. See 
also North East Atlantic Fisheries Comm’n, Performance Review Panel Report 14, 17 
(2006). 
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The coastal states also allocate the coastal state TAC between 
them, without specifying which part of each coastal state’s alloca-
tion should be caught within or beyond areas under national juris-
diction.168 NEAFC is then charged with determining and allocating 
the high seas TAC.169 Even though room for maneuvering seems 
limited, it should not be forgotten that there are only five Members 
of NEAFC and three of these are regarded as coastal states, with 
respect to all three main straddling fish stocks regulated              
by NEAFC.170  
 While Canada and the United States would, as coastal states, 
of course benefit from such preferential treatment as well, it is not 
excluded that they would object to such practices in order to be 
consistent with their user or non-user interests in other RFMOs 
and Arrangements. Much more problematic, however, are the user 
interests of states that are not coastal states with respect to the 
North-East Atlantic Ocean or the Arctic Ocean: e.g., the other 
states that currently have the status of NCP with NEAFC (Belize, 
Cook Islands, Japan and New Zealand) and other states with large 
distant water fishing fleets, such as China and South Korea. Even 
though fishing opportunities in the high seas pocket of the central 
Arctic Ocean are likely to be very minimal in the near future, cli-
mate change may alter the Arctic marine area, both rapidly and 
fundamentally, in the medium term. Consequently, it cannot be 
ruled out that fishing opportunities in the high seas of the Arctic 
Ocean will be substantial in the medium and long terms. Not only 
is the size of the high seas pocket enormous, but the fisheries on 
the nose and tail of the Grand Banks in the Northwest Atlantic 
also aptly illustrate that just a small area of the high seas may be 
sufficient. 
 
C.  Adjusting the Spatial Scope of the OSPAR Convention 
 
 In case it is deemed desirable to pursue integrated, cross-
sectoral, ecosystem-based ocean governance in the Arctic Ocean, it 
                                                                                                                   
      168. See 2008 Agreed Record, supra note 167, annex I, para. 1.  
      169. With respect to mackerel, see, e.g., NORTH EAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMM’N, 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW PANEL REPORT OF THE NORTH EAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMMIS-
SION RECOMMENDATION ON MACKEREL, RECOMMENDATION I: 2008 (2008), available at 
http : / /nea fc .o rg /measures / current_measures /1_mackere l -08 .html  ( s tat ing 
“[r]ecommendation by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fish-
eries at its Annual Meeting in November 2007 to adopt conservation and management 
measures for mackerel in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008.”). 
      170. These are blue whiting, herring and mackerel. The Russian Federation is not re-
garded as a coastal state for blue whiting and mackerel and Iceland is not regarded as a 
coastal state for mackerel. 
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is logical to examine the opportunities and limitations of adjusting 
the spatial scope of the OSPAR Convention for the reason that the 
Convention already covers the Atlantic sector of the Arctic Ocean. 
It is interesting to note that whereas the Arctic Communication 
refers explicitly to the option of adjusting the spatial scope of the 
NEAFC Convention, this option is not raised with regard to the 
OSPAR Convention. Quite surprisingly, the Arctic Communica-
tion, in fact, does not explicitly refer to the OSPAR Convention or 
the OSPAR Commission at all. 
 There are currently sixteen parties to the OSPAR Convention: 
two states that are located upstream on watercourses reaching the 
OSPAR Maritime Area (Luxemburg and Switzerland); the EC; and 
all coastal states bordering the North-East Atlantic, except the 
Russian Federation. The spatial adjustment of the OSPAR Con-
vention is specifically mentioned in Article 27(2), which stipulates: 
 
The Contracting Parties may unanimously invite 
States or regional economic integration organisations 
not referred to in Article 25 to accede to the Conven-
tion. In the case of such an accession, the definition of 
the maritime area shall, if necessary, be amended by 
a decision of the Commission adopted by unanimous 
vote of the Contracting Parties. Any such amendment 
shall enter into force after unanimous approval of all 
the Contracting Parties on the thirtieth day after the 
rece ipt  o f  the  las t  no t i f i cat ion  by  the  De-
positary Government.171 
 
 The states envisaged by this provision can, in view of the list in 
Article 25, be either coastal states whose maritime zones are adja-
cent or near to the OSPAR Maritime Area or states that have no 
such maritime zones (e.g. states whose vessels or nationals are en-
gaged in activities in the OSPAR Maritime Area). While it is not 
clear which states of the former category the negotiators had in 
mind when negotiating this provision, Canada and the United 
States would seem to be among them. The Russian Federation 
does not need an invitation to accede, as Article 27(1) gives it, as a 
coastal state to the OSPAR Maritime Area, a right to do so.  If de-
sired, an extension of the OSPAR Maritime Area would, in such a 
case, probably have to follow the amendment procedure laid down 
in Article 15.  
 As pointed out earlier, the northern boundaries of the OSPAR 
                                                                                                                   
      171.  OSPAR Convention, supra note 9, art. 27(2). 
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Convention are identical to those of its predecessors, the Oslo Con-
vention and the Paris Convention, which were in their turn mod-
eled exactly on those of the 1959 predecessor to the NEAFC Con-
vention. It was also noted that the rationale for these northern 
boundaries is not evident.  
 Similar to the discussion in section III, a distinction can be 
made between relatively small adjustments and a large adjust-
ment by which the entire Arctic Ocean would be comprised within 
the OSPAR Maritime Area. Small adjustments, expansions as well 
as contractions, may for instance be warranted due to changes in 
the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention or the creation of an 
Arctic marine environmental protection regime immediately adja-
cent to the OSPAR Maritime Area. In view of the discussion above, 
it is clear that nothing in the OSPAR Convention would preclude 
such spatial adjustments, as such. 
 Similarly, nothing in the OSPAR Convention would preclude a 
large adjustment by which the entire Arctic Ocean would be com-
prised within the OSPAR Maritime Area, as such. This may, for 
instance, be warranted if a similar adjustment is made in the spa-
tial scope of the NEAFC Convention and a 100% overlap is desira-
ble. This option would have the considerable advantage of subject-
ing the entire Arctic Ocean to the OSPAR Commission’s compe-
tence on cross-sectoral issues and sectoral activities that are not 
yet subject to the competence of other regional and global bodies. It 
should also be remembered, however, that the shortcomings of the 
OSPAR Convention and the OSPAR Commission would be trans-
posed to the Arctic Ocean as well.  
 More important seem to be the preparedness of Canada, the 
Russian Federation and the United States to become bound to the 
OSPAR Convention and the many legally binding decisions, non-
legally binding recommendations and other agreements adopted by 
the OSPAR Commission. Would they be prepared to accept this 
“acquis” without significant amendments? Perhaps this is one of 
the main reasons why the Russian Federation is currently not a 
party to the OSPAR Convention, even though it is a coastal state 
to the OSPAR Maritime Area. It is also noteworthy that neither 
the Russian Federation nor the Soviet Union were parties to the 
Oslo and Paris Conventions. 
 
D.  Implementing Agreement under the LOS Convention 
 
 It has been suggested that in case a legally binding instrument 
for the marine Arctic is pursued, one option would be to link it di-
rectly to the LOS Convention by means of an Implementing 
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Agreement, under the LOS Convention.172 It must be acknowl-
edged that no rule of international law, including the LOS Conven-
tion, would preclude this per se. Even though the LOS Convention 
contains various amendment procedures,173 at two earlier in-
stances the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) expressed 
the international community’s preference for an Implementing 
Agreement instead. These are the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining 
Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. Pragmatic and stra-
tegic considerations may therefore be of overriding importance. 
This is particularly evident in the case of the Part XI Deep-Sea 
Mining Agreement, which clearly modifies Part XI of the LOS 
Convention. Thus, while there is no precedent for an Implementing 
Agreement with a regional scope,174 no rule of international law, 
including the LOS Convention, would in principle prevent the in-
ternational community from pursuing such an option if the re-
quired majority so desires.  
 This notwithstanding, there are various reasons why an Im-
plementing Agreement under the LOS Convention is not a realistic 
option. Most importantly, the direct link with the LOS Convention 
would imply that its negotiation process would fall under the UN-
GA. Not only would the UNGA decide on the overall objective, 
scope, and main elements of an Implementing Agreement but it 
would also determine, implicitly or explicitly, the rules of proce-
dure for its negotiation. As the LOS Convention is a global instru-
ment and the UNGA a global body, it would be difficult to conceive 
of a negotiation process open to a select group of states instead of 
all members of the United Nations (UN). However, it is almost un-
thinkable that the five Arctic Ocean coastal states would support 
and participate in a negotiation process where they could poten-
tially be confronted by 180-odd states with opposing views           
                                                                                                                   
      172. This has, for instance, been suggested by the Executive Director of the European 
Environment Agency (EEA). See Jaqueline McGlade, Executive Dir., Eur. Env’t Agency, The 
Arctic Environment - Why Europe Should Care, Speech Delivered at the Arctic Frontiers 
Conference, Tromsø (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/ 
speeches/23-01-2007. The actual wording used in this speech is “Polar Ocean protocol.” Id. 
This wording is confusing because it can be interpreted as applying to both the Arctic Ocean 
and the Southern Ocean. Note that the words “based on UNCLOS” on page 10 of the Euro-
pean Commission’s Arctic Communication, supra note 97, indicate that the option of an 
Implementation Agreement under the LOS Convention is no longer being pursued. 
      173. See LOS Convention, supra note 10, arts. 312-316. 
      174. None of the existing regional marine environmental protection regimes are 
formally linked to the LOS Convention. While the LOS Convention contains qualified 
obligations on regional cooperation, it does not provide guidance on the outcome of such 
cooperation. Likewise, the constituent instruments of RFMOs and Arrangements are not(?) 
formally linked to the LOS Convention or the Fish Stocks Agreement, even though the Fish 
Stocks Agreement provides considerable guidance as regards the functions and operation of 
RFMOs and Arrangements and the substance of their constituent instruments.  
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and interests.  
 Such lack of support by the Arctic Ocean coastal states would 
be obvious if the envisaged Implementing Agreement would apply 
to the entire Arctic Ocean, including areas under their national 
jurisdiction. However, even if the instrument would exclusively 
apply to areas beyond national jurisdiction (high seas and the 
Area), it is easy to understand that the Arctic Ocean coastal states 
would fear that the UNGA would not take adequate account of 
their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction as coastal 
states when determining substantive and procedural aspects of the 
negotiation process. States with a claim or the basis for a claim to 
the Antarctic continent had, to some extent, similar concerns when 
they were confronted by the Malaysian-led initiative to bring the 
governance of Antarctica under the scope of the UN.175 In light of 
these considerations, it is not surprising that there is no precedent 
for an Implementing Agreement to the LOS Convention with a  
regional scope. 
 Such an instrument might also serve a purpose that is essen-
tially similar to the guidance provided by the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment on the functions and operation of RFMOs and Arrangements 
and the substance of their constituent instruments. This global 
Implementing Agreement could then provide guidance on the sub-
stance of the regional Arctic instrument and the functions and op-
eration of the bodies established by it. 
 
E.  Arguments For and Against a New International Legally    
Binding Instrument for the Governance and Regulation of the            
Arctic Ocean 
 
 Emphasizing the many benefits that one or more 
binding agreements might offer, various authors and 
organizations have advocated for the negotiation of a 
hard law regime for the Arctic. Suggested benefits in-
clude: encouraging greater political and bureaucratic 
commitments; establishing firmer institutional and fi-
nancial foundations; transcending the vagaries of 
changing governmental viewpoints and shifting per-
sonnel; giving ‘legal teeth’ to environmental principles 
and standards; raising the public profile of regional 
challenges and cooperation needs; and providing for 
                                                                                                                   
      175. See G.A. Res. 38/77, para. 1, U.N. DOC. A/RES/38/77 (Dec. 15, 1983); Christopher 
C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Indian Ocean States: The Interplay of Law, Interests, and 
Geopolitics, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 41, 48-49 (1990). 
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dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 However, various reasons have been put forward 
against—or at least questioning—a treaty-based ap-
proach. Reasons given include the following considera-
tions: difficulty in getting consensus on the need for an 
agreement; lengthy and costly preparatory and nego-
tiation processes involved; risk of legalizing lowest 
common denominator standards; stifling political and 
bureaucratic flexibilities; and contributing another 
layer of complexity to the already fragmented array of 
multilateral environmental agreements. The lack of 
implementation of existing agreements relevant to the 
Arctic and lack of assurance that all Arctic states will 
readily accept newly negotiated obligations are         
additional reasons.176  
 
 A few things are certain about the future of ocean governance 
in the Arctic. The quest for effective transboundary cooperation is 
not over and voices within the EU and Canada are bound to keep 





















                                                                                                                   
      176. Timo Koivurova & David L. VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years: 
Retrospect and Prospects, 40 UNIV. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 121, 178-80 (2007) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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